Abstract. We consider compactness characterizations of large cardinals. Based on results of Benda [Ben78], we study compactness for omitting types in various logics. In Lκ,κ, this allows us to characterize any large cardinal defined in terms of normal ultrafilters, and we also analyze second-order and sort logic. In particular, we give a compactness for omitting types characterization of huge cardinals, which have consistency strength beyond Vopěnka's Principle.
Introduction
Large cardinals typically have many equivalent formulations: elementary embeddings, ultrafilters or systems of ultrafilters, combinatorial properties, etc. We investigate various characterizations in terms of logical compactness. These formulations have a long history. Weakly and strongly compact cardinals, which were first isolated with generalizations of the compactness theorem to infinitary languages. (1) κ > ω is weakly compact iff every < κ-satisfiable theory of size κ in L κ,κ is satisfiable.
(2) κ > ω is strongly compact iff every < κ-satisfiable theory in L κ,κ is satisfiable.
Measurable cardinals also have such a characterization, this time in terms of chain compactness of L κ,κ . This result is interesting because it seems to have been well-known in the past (evidenced by the fact that it appears as an exercise in Chang and Keisler's Model Theory [CK12, Exercise 4.2.6]), but seems to have fallen out of common knowledge even among researchers working in the intersection of set theory and model theory (at least among the younger generation) 1 . Fact 1.2. κ is measurable iff every theory T ⊂ L κ,κ that can be written as a union of an increasing κ-sequence of satisfiable theories is itself satisfiable.
Magidor [Mag71, Theorem 4] showed that extendible cardinals are the compactness cardinals of second-order and Makowsky [Mak85] gives an over-arching result that Vopěnka's Principle is equivalent to the existence of a compactness cardinals for every logic (see Fact 3.11 below). This seems to situate Vopěnka's Principle as an upper bound to the strength of cardinals that can be reached by compactness characterizations.
However, this is not the case. Instead, a new style of compactness is needed, which we call compactness for omitting types (Definition 3.4). Recall that a type p(x) in a logic L is a collection of L-formulas in free variable x. A model M realizes p if there is a ∈ M realizing every formula Date: August 2, 2018 This material is based upon work done while the author was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. DMS-1402191. 1 This is based on the author's personal impressions. Although the statement seems forgotten, the proof is standard: if T = ∪α<κTα and Mα Tα, then set Mκ := Mα/U for any κ-complete, nonprincipal ultrafilter U on κ. Loś' Theorem for Lκ,κ implies Mκ T .
in p, and omits p if it does not realize it. Explicitly, this means that for every a ∈ M , there is φ(x) ∈ p such that M ¬φ(a). Although realizing a type in L can be coded in the same logic by adding a new constant, omitting a type is much more difficult. Thus while, in first-order logic types can be realized using a simple compactness argument, finding models omitting a type is much more difficult. This is the inspiration for Gerald Sacks' remark 2 [Sac10, p. 64] "A not well-known model theorist once remarked: 'Any fool can realize a type, but it takes a model theorist to omit one.' " Compactness for omitting types was first (and seemingly uniquely) used by Benda to characterize supercompact cardinals in L κ,κ . Tragically, Benda's fantastic result is even less well-known than the characterization of measurable cardinals. In the almost 40 years since it's publication, the publisher reports zero citations of Benda's paper. The final model omits the type q(y) = {φ i (a, y) | i < λ}, where a is the witness to the existential. Phrased in these terms, this property says that if every small part of a type can be omitted, then the whole type can be omitted. One complicating factor is that monotonicity for type omission works in the reverse direction as for theory satisfaction: larger types are easier to omit since they contain more formulas. This makes Benda's result somewhat awkward to phrase as he fixes the theory.
Our phrasing of compactness for omitting types varies from Benda's formulation in two key ways. First, we also allow the theory to be broken into smaller pieces, which makes the phrasing more natural (at least from the author's perspective). Second, and more crucially, we look at other index sets (or templates) than P κ λ. This allows us to capture many more large cardinals than just supercompacts.
Other model-theoretic properties have also been used to characterize large cardinals, mainly in the area of reflection properties and the existence of Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski numbers. Magidor [Mag71, Theorem 2] characterizes supercompacts as the Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski numbers for second-order, and Magidor and Väänänen [MV11] explore the possibilities surrounding the Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski numbers of various fragments of second-order logic. Bagaria and Väänänen [BV16] connect structural reflection properties and Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski numbers through Väänänen's notion of symbiosis. Of course, Chang's Conjecture has long been known to have large cardinal strength (see [CK12, Section 7 .3]).
Section 2 fixes our notation and gives some basic results. Section 3 establishes the main definitions of compactness for type omission and applies it to the logics L κ,κ . The main result in this section is Theorem 3.5. Section 4 examines type-omitting compactness for higher-order (Theorem 4.1) and sort (Theorem 4.9) logics. This section also deals with compactness characterizations of some other cardinals (e. g., strong) and discusses the notion of elementary substructure in second-order logic. Section 5 discusses extenders and type omission around the following question: we give characterizations of large cardinals with various logics, from L κ,κ to the all-powerful L s,Σn . However, L κ,κ is already able to work its way up the large cardinal hierarchy, including n-hugeness (Corollary 3.6) and rank-into-rank (Section 4.2). Are these more powerful logics necessary? In other words, can we characterize all model-theoreticaly characaterizable large cardinals (extendible, etc.) by some property of L κ,κ , or is the use of stronger logics necessary to pin down certain cardinals? We focus on strong cardinals, and give a theory and collection of types such that the ability to find a model of the theory omitting the types is equivalent to κ being λ strong. As close as this seems to an L κ,κ (or rather L κ,ω (Q W F )) characterization of strong cardinals, we still lack a general compactness for type omission for this case.
Preliminary results along these lines were first presented at the Workshop on Set-Theoretical Aspects of the Model Theory of Strong Logics hosted by the Centre de Recerca Matemàtica in 2016, and I'd like to thank many of the participants for helpful conversations, especially Jouko Väänänen for discussions about sort logic. I'd also like to thank Gabriel Goldberg for helpful discussions regarding the strength of huge-for-L 2 κ,κ cardinals, and Adrian Mathias and Sebastien Vasey for comments on a preliminary draft.
Preliminaries
We begin with an informal introduction to the logics used. The large cardinals notions are standard; consult Kanamori [Kan08] or the locally given citation for detail. We introduce some new large cardinal notions, typically naming them and defining them in the statement of a result: see Corollary 3.7, Proposition 4.4, and Theorems 4.5 and 4.8.
L ω,ω is the standard, elementary first-order logic. L λ,κ augments by allowing
• conjunctions of < λ-many formulas that together contain < κ-many free variables;
• < κ-ary functions and relations in the language.
• universal and existential quantification over < κ-many variables at once.
We typically restrict to λ ≥ κ, both regular.
ω,ω is second-order logic which extends L ω,ω by allowing quantification over subsets of cartesian powers of the universe and has an atomic 'membership' relation. We can also introduce higher-order variants
so we focus on L 2 . The standard interpretation of the quantification is over all subsets, but an important concept is the nonstandard Henkin models (M, P, E), where M is a τ -structure, E ⊂ M × P is an extensional relation, and P represents a collection of subsets that the secondorder quantifiers can range over. The class of Henkin models of a second-order theory reduces to the models of a sorted L ω,ω -theory, but we will still find use for this definition in Definition 4.6 and the characterization of strong cardinals.
Additionally, when dealing with second-order logic, we allow the language to include functions and relations whose domain and range include the second-order part of the model. Given such a second-order language τ , we describe it as consisting of a first-order part and a strictly secondorder part.
augmented by the quantifier Q W F that takes in two free variables and so Q W F xyφ(x, y, z) is true iff there is no infinite sequence {x n | n < ω} such that φ(x n+1 , x n , z) holds for all n < ω; that is, φ(x, y, z) defines a well-founded relation. Note that, in models of some choice, Q W F is both L ω1,ω1 and L 2 expressible. However, it will be useful to have, e.g., in Theorem 4.7.
Finally, sort logic L s is a logic introduced by Väänänen [Vää79] . This augments second-order logic by adding sort quantifiers ∃ ∼ , ∀ ∼ where ∃ ∼ Xφ(X, x) is true iff there is a set X (any set, not just a subset of the universe) such that φ(X, x) is true. Sort logic is very powerful because it allows one to access a large range of information regardless of the language of the initial structure. For instance, one can easily write down a formula Φ whose truth in any structure implies the existence of an inaccessible cardinal. Väänänen discusses its use as a foundation of mathematics in [Vää14] . Since sort logic involves satisfaction of formulas in V , for definability of truth reasons, we must restrict to the logics L s,Σn that are Σ n when looking at the quantifiers over sorts.
Finally, all of these logics can be combined in the expected way, e.g., L 2 κ,κ . We often take the union of two logics, e.g., L 2 ∪ L κ,ω is the logic whose formulas are in L 2 or L κ,ω ; however, no second-order quantifier or variable can appear in any formula with an infinite conjunction, which separates it from L 2 κ,ω . We typically use boldface L when discussing a particular logic and script L when discussing an abstract logic.
For a logic L and a language τ , an L(τ )-theory T is a collection of sentences (formulas with no free variables) of L(τ ). An L(τ )-type p(x) in x is a collection of formulas from L(τ ) all of whose free variables are at most x.
3 A type p(x) is realized in a τ -structure M iff there is an element of the model that satisfies every formula in it and a type is omitted precisely when it is not realized. Note that the "monotonicity of type omission" works the opposite way as theories: if p(x) ⊂ q(x) are both types, then it is easier to omit q than p. We will often refer to filtrations of a theory T . This means there is some ambient partial order (I, ⊂) and a collection of theories {T s | s ∈ I} such that T = s∈I T s and s ⊂ t implies T s ⊂ T t .
In general, we are agnostic about how one codes these logics as sets, except to insist that it is done in a reasonable way, e.g., τ is coded as a set of rank |τ | + ω, L κ,κ (τ ) ⊂ V κ+|τ | , etc. This gives us two nice facts about the interaction between languages τ and elementary embeddings j : V → M (or V α → V β , etc.) with crit j = κ:
• if τ is made up of < κ-ary functions and relations, then j"τ and τ are just renamings of each other; and
This means that, when searching for a model of T , it will suffice to find a model of j"T , which is a theory in the same logic and an isomorphic language.
Given an inner model 4 M (or some V α ), we collect some facts about when M is correct about various logics. That is, the statement "M is a τ -structure" is absolute from M to V and we want to know when the same holds of "φ is an L(τ )-formula and M L φ."
• M is correct about the logic
As a warm-up, note that any compactness involving an extension of L(Q W F ) will entail the existence of large cardinals. Fixing κ, if
is satisfiable, then there is a non-surjective elementary embedding j : V κ+1 → M to a wellfounded structure with crit j ≤ κ. Standard results imply that crit j must be measurable. Moreover, T is 'locally satisfiable' in the sense that, if T 0 ⊂ T does not contain constants for elements with ranks unbounded in κ, then V κ+1 can be made a model of T 0 by adding constants.
3. Type-omitting compactness in L ∞,∞
We introduce some basic definitions that will be used in each of our characterizations.
Definition 3.1. Let κ ≤ λ and I ⊂ P(λ).
(1) I is κ-robust iff for every α < λ, [α] I := {s ∈ I | α ∈ s} = ∅; and I ⊂ {s : |s ∩ κ| < κ}. (2) C ⊂ I contains a κ-club iff there is a function F : [λ] 2 → P κ λ such that C(F ) := {s ∈ I | s is infinite and, for all x, y, ∈ s, F (x, y) ⊂ s} ⊂ C Let U be an ultrafilter on I.
(3) U is µ-complete iff for all α < µ and {X β ∈ U | β < α}, we have
The conditions of κ-robustness are intended to make sure that I includes enough sets so that the notion of a "κ-complete, normal, fine ultrafilter on I" makes sense and is possible. In particular, any such ultrafilter U will be characterized by an elementary embedding j U with crit j U = κ; this implies that {s ∈ I : |s ∩ κ| < κ} ∈ U .
We define the notion of 'contains a strong κ-club' without defining the notion of a strong κ-club. However, the first two items of Fact3.2 show that this notion correctly generalizes the notion of containing a club from κ and P κ λ. Moreover, the third item shows that a generalization that replaces P κ λ with a different set does not work. (1) If I = P κ λ, then containing a strong κ-club is equivalent to containing a club. (2) If U is a κ-complete, fine, normal ultrafilter on I, then it extends the contains a strong κ-club filter.
κ and U is a κ-complete, fine, normal ultrafilter on I, then there is no 2 → P κ λ and suppose that C(F ) ∈ U . Then, for each s ∈ I − C(F ), there are α s < β s ∈ s such that F (α s , β s ) ⊂ s. By applying normality twice, there is some Z ∈ U and α * < β * such that, for all s ∈ Z, α s = α * and β s = β * . By the κ-completeness and fineness of U , we have that [f (α * , β * )] ∈ U . Thus, there is t ∈ Z ∩ [f (α * , β * )]; however, this is a contradiction.
For (3), given such a U , build the elementary embedding j U :
However, since |s| = κ = crit j U , there is some α ∈ j U (s) − j U "λ. In particular, this means that
We are interested in model-theoretic conditions that guarantee the existence of a fine, normal, κ-complete ultrafilter on some κ-robust I. Recall that, from Kunen's proof of the inconsistency of Reinhardt cardinals, every countably complete ultrafilter must concentrate on P µ λ for some µ ≤ λ. In case this µ is strictly larger than the completeness of the ultrafilter, we will need the following technical condition. In practice, the set X will always be a theory.
Definition 3.3. Let I ⊂ P(λ) and X be a set that is filtrated as an increasing union of {X s | s ∈ I}. Then we say this filtration respects the index iff there is a collection {X t | t ∈ P κ λ} such that, for each s ∈ I, X s = ∪ t⊂s X t .
This condition says that the filtration at s ∈ I is just determined by the elements of s. Note this condition is trivially satisfied when I ⊂ P κ λ, but will be important in certain cases, e.g., to characterize huge cardinals (see Corollary 3.6.(3)). There, it will guarantee that if φ ∈ ∪ s∈[λ] κ T s , then there are a large number of s ∈ I such that φ ∈ T s .
The main concept of this section is the following:
Definition 3.4. Let L be a logic (in the sense of Barwise [Bar74] or taken without formal definition), κ ≤ λ, and I ⊂ P(λ) be κ-robust. Then we say that L is I-κ-compact for type omission iff for any language τ , any L(τ )-theory T that can be written as an increasing union of T s for s ∈ I that respects the index, and collection of L(τ )-types {p a (x) | a ∈ A}, if {s ∈ I | T s has a model omitting each type in {p a s (x) | a ∈ A}} contains a strong κ-club, then there is a model of T omitting each type in {p a (x) | a ∈ A}.
We can link this to other notions as follows:
Theorem 3.5. Let κ ≤ λ, and I ⊂ P(λ) be κ-robust. The following are equivalent:
There is a fine, normal, maximally κ-complete ultrafilter on P(λ) concentrating on I.
(4) There is an elementary j : V → M with crit j = κ and j"λ ∈ M ∩ j(I).
Moreover, the first µ such that L µ,ω is I-κ-compact for type omission is the first µ with a fine, normal, µ-complete ultrafilter on I.
Proof: The equivalence of (3) and (4) is straightforward from standard methods and (2) implies (1) is obvious.
(4) → (2): Suppose we have a set-up for I-κ-compact type omission. Let F : [λ] 2 → P κ λ be the witnessing function and, for s ∈ C(F ), let M s T s and omit {p a s | a ∈ A}. WritingM for the function taking s to M s , j(M ) is a function with domain j (C(F )). By standard arguments, j"λ ∈ j (C(F )). Then M thinks that j(M )(j"λ) is a j(τ )-structure that models j(T )(j"λ) that omits each j(p a )(j"λ). Then M is correct about this, so some canonical renaming of j(M )(j"λ) models T and omits each p a .
(1) → (3): Set τ = {P, Q, E, c X , d} X⊂I with P and Q unary predicates, E ⊂ P × Q a binary relation, and c X , d constants. We look at the standard structure M = I, P(I), ∈, X X⊂I that has no interpretation for d. Set T 0 = T h Lκ,ω (M ) (although much less is necessary). Set
Now we have a set-up for compactness for type omission. Claim 1: If there is a model of T omitting Γ, then there is a fine, normal, κ-complete ultrafilter on I.
Let N be this model. Define U on I by
It is straightforward to check that U is a κ-complete ultrafilter on I. For instance, given X α ∈ U | α < µ < κ , we know that the following sentence is in T :
Thus, N dEc ∩α<µXα . Given α < λ, by κ-robustness, there is some s ∈ I such that α ∈ s. Thus T entails dEc [α] I , so U is fine. For normality, if F : I → λ is regressive on a U -large set, then N dEc XF . Since N omits p F , there is α < λ such that X F,α ∈ U , so U is normal. Claim 2: For each s ∈ I, there is a model of T s omitting {p F,s | F : I → λ}.
By the I-κ-compactness for type omission, we are done.
The proof of the "moreover" follows similarly.
†
As an example of the moreover, L ω,ω satisfies Benda's supercompactness theorem iff P ω λ carries a fine, normal measure that need not even be countably complete. Note that L ω,ω can never be P ω λ-ω-compact for type omission: the max function shows that no fine ultrafilter on P ω λ can be normal.
This general framework directly gives model theoretic characterizations of large cardinals that are characterized by normal ultrafilters.
Corollary 3.6. For each numbered item below, all of its subitems are equivalent:
(
Proof: The proof follows the standard characterizations of these notions in terms of normal ultrafilters (see [Kan08] ) and from Theorem 3.5. † Item (2) is Benda's supercompactness theorem (Fact 1.3). Item (1) can be reformulated along the lines of Fact 1.2:
This helps highlight the impact that the normality of an ultrafilter has on the resulting ultraproduct: if U is a normal ultrafilter on I ⊂ P(λ) and {M s | s ∈ I} are τ -structures, then M s /U omits any type p = {φ α (x) | α < λ} such that {s ∈ I | M s omits p s } ∈ U . As mentioned above, any ultrafilter on P(λ) concentrates on a P µ λ. We can characterize when an ultrafilter exists on some P µ λ with the following large cardinal notion:
Corollary 3.7. Fix κ ≤ µ ≤ λ. The following are equivalent:
(1) κ is λ-supercompact with µ clearing: there is j : V → M with j"λ ∈ M and j(µ) > λ.
(2) L κ,κ is P µ λ-κ-compact for type omission.
Proof: This follows from Theorem 3.5: j(µ) > λ ensures that j"λ ∈ j(P µ λ). † One feature of the compactness schema are that the theories are not required to have a specific size, but rather should be filtrated by a particular index set. Note this is also true for strongly compact cardinals; that is, rather than characterizing λ-strongly compact cardinals as compactness cardinals for λ-sized theories in L κ,κ , we can give the following.
Proposition 3.8. κ is λ-strongly compact iff any L κ,κ -theory T that can be filtrated as an increasing union of satisfiable theories indexed by P κ λ is itself satisfiable.
This can even be extended to theories of proper class size. Each item of Corollary 3.6 remains true if compactness for type omission is generalized to allow for the T and the T s in Definition 3.4 to be definable proper classes. The proof of Theorem 3.5 goes through with this generalization.
Remark 3.9. ED L (V, ∈, x) x∈V is used to denote the L-elementary diagram of the structure with universe V , a single binary relation ∈, and a constant for each x that is interpreted as x. Formally, from Tarski's undefinability of truth, this is not a definable class when L extends L ω,ω . Similarly, the statement that j : V → M is elementary is not definable.
However, e.g., [Kan08, Proposition 5.1.(c)] shows that, for embeddings between inner models, Σ 1 -elementarity implies Σ n -elementarity for every n < ω. Thus, mentions of elementary embeddings with domain V can be replaced by Σ 1 -elementarity. Similarly, the full elementary diagram of V could be replaced by its Σ 1 -counterpart. However, following set-theoretic convention, we continue to refer to the full elementary diagram.
Armed with a class version of omitting types compactness, we can show equivalences directly between the model-theoretic characterizations and the elementary embedding characterizations without working through an ultrafilter characterization. At each stage, we find a model N of ED Lκ,κ (V, ∈, x) x∈V along with the sentences {c α < c < c κ | α < κ}, where c is a new constant, and some other sentences. Such a model is well-founded because it models the L ω1,ω1 -sentence asserting well-foundedness, so we can take the Mostowski collapse π :
is an L κ,κ -elementary embedding that necessarily sends α < κ to itself. Moreover, the interpretation of c guarantees that the critical point is at most κ and the use of L κ,ω guarantees the critical point is at least κ. This is enough to show κ is measurable and extra sentences to be satisfied and types to be omitted can be added to characterize the above large cardinal notions. The following observation is straightforward.
Proposition 3.10. For each numbered item below, all of its subitems are equivalent:
(1) (a) κ is measurable.
(b) There is a model of
There is a model of
that omits, for i < n,
Also, in each case the theory has a natural filtration by the appropriate partial order that is easily seen to be locally consistent while omitting the necessary type. For instance, in the case of κ being λ-supercompact, for s ∈ P κ λ, set α s := otp(s).
Then V is a model of this theory by interpreting every constant in the language by its index, c as α s , and d as s. This gives a way to go directly between model-theoretic and elementary embedding characterizations. It also shows that it is enough to omit a single 5 type to obtain the I-κ-type omission for any number of types.
The ability to characterize cardinals at the level of huge and above shows that the addition of type omission to attempts to characterize large cardinals is a real necessity. Measurable and strongly compact cardinals have known model-theoretic characaterizations without type omission, so one might wonder if type omission is necessary to characterize huge cardinals. From the following theorem of Makowsky, we can deduce that it is necessary. (1) Every logic L has a strong compactness cardinal; that is, for every logic L, there is a cardinal µ L such that for any language τ and L(τ )-theory T , if every T 0 ∈ P µL T has a model then so does T . (2) Vopěnka's Principle.
Thus, Vopěnka's Principle "rallies at last to force a veritable Götterdammerung" for compactness cardinals for logics 6 . Nonetheless, κ being almost huge implies that V κ satisfies Vopěnka's Principle. Thus, if κ is the first huge cardinal, then V κ is a model of "Every logic is compact, but there are no µ ≤ λ such that µ is [λ] µ -µ-compact for type omission." Indeed, other approaches to model-theoretic characterizations of large cardinals focused solely on compactness or reflection principles have yet to characterize huge cardinals.
Second-order logic and beyond
We now turn to characterizations based on logics beyond (or orthogonal to) L ∞,∞ . In the spirit of Theorem 3.5, we can characterize compactness for omitting types in second-order logic with a similar theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Let κ ≤ λ and I ⊂ P(λ) be κ-robust. The following are equivalent:
(3) For every α > λ, there is some j : V α → V β such that crit j = κ and j"λ ∈ j(I). 5 In the case of n-huge, recall that the omission of finitely many types can be coded by the omission of a single type. 6 With apologies to Kanamori [Kan08, p. 324 ].
(4) For every α > λ, there is some j : V → M such that crit j = κ, j"λ ∈ j(I), and
Moreover, the first µ such that L 2 is I-κ-compact for type omission is the first µ that satisfies (3) except with crit j = µ.
Proof: (4) implies (3) and (2) implies (1) are immediate. We show that (1) implies (3) implies (4) implies (2).
For (1) implies (3), fix α ≥ λ and consider the L 2 ∪ L κ,ω -theory and type
where d is a new constant symbol and Φ ∈ L 2 is a sentence that asserts the universe is isomorphic to a rank-initial segment of V (see the proof of [Mag71, Theorem 2]). Then, we can filtrate this theory as
For each s ∈ I, we have that the natural expansion (V α , ∈, x, s) x∈V sup s∪[κ,α) models T s and omits p s . Thus, our compactness principle tells us there is a model of T omitting p, which, after taking the transitive collapse, gives the desired j :
For (3) implies (4), fix α ≥ λ and let α ′ be the next strong limit cardinal above α. Then there is j : V α ′ → V β with crit j = κ and j"λ ∈ j(I). Then derive the extender E of length j(α) to capture this embedding. Forming the extender power of V and taking the transitive collapse, we get j E : V → M E with the desired properties.
For (4) implies (2), letT = {T s | s ∈ I} be an increasing filtration of the L 2 κ,κ -theory T that respects the index and {p a (x) | a ∈ A} be a collection of types indexed as p a (x) = {φ a i (x) | i < λ} such that there are a club of s ∈ I with a model M s that models T s and omits each p a s . Fix strong limit α ≥ λ to be greater than the rank of these models, their power sets, and the function f that takes each of these s to M s ; form j : V → M with crit j = κ, j"λ ∈ j(I) ∩ M, and V j(α) ⊂ M. Since the domain of f contains a club, it includes j"λ. Set M * := j(f )(j"λ). By the elementarity of j, inside of M we have that M * j(T ) j"λ and, for each a ∈ A, M * omits
M is correct about this satisfaction. Finally, j"T ⊂ j(T ) j"λ because the filtration respects the index. Thus, after a suitable renaming, we have found a model of T omitting {p a (x) | a ∈ A}. † To aid in the discussion of the implication of this theorem, we introduce the following ad hoc naming convention for large cardinal properties.
Definition 4.2. Suppose a large cardinal property P is characterized by being an I-κ-compactness cardinal for L κ,κ . Given a logic L, we say that κ is P -for-L iff L is I-κ-compact for type omission. 
κ -κ-compact for type omission. Comparing Theorems 3.5 and 4.1, a large difference is that the first-order characterizations are witnessed by a single embedding, while the second-order characterizations require class many embeddings. The reason for this is that a single model M can be right about L κ,κ everywhere, but cannot be right about L 2 everywhere; otherwise, it would compute the power set of every set correctly and would be V . Similarly, the type omitting compactness does not hold for definable class theories for second-order as it does for first. If it did, one could easily derive an nontrivial embedding j : V → V .
The first consequence of Theorem 4.1 regards the identity crisis. In the language of Definition 4.2, Magidor has shown that extendible cardinals are exactly those that are strong compact-for-L 2 κ,κ [Mag71, Theorem 4] and additionally shown that the first strongly compact cardinal could be the first measurable or the first supercompact [Mag76] . This second result means that various compactness notions for L κ,κ have an imprecise relation to one another: chain compactnes could coincide with compactness, or there could be many chain compact cardinals below the first compactness cardinal. Surprisingly, when moving to L 2 , these notions coincide and the identity crisis disappears! Theorem 4.3. The following are equivalent.
In particular, all three of these statements characterize extendible cardinals.
Here we take 'κ is measurable-for-L' as in Fact 1.2. That is, we don't incorporate any type omission; however, the type omission characterization holds as a result of the above.
Proof: Clearly, (3) implies (2) implies (1) using (for the first implication) the trivially omitted type {x = x | i < λ}.
The condition Theorem 4.1.(3) is clearly stronger than extendability, so any compactness for L 2 κ,κ (including chain compactness) gives extendability. In particular, j"κ = κ ∈ j(P κ κ). So measurable-for-L 2 ∪ L κ,ω implies extendable. Similarly, the definition of extendability includes that j(κ) > α. In this case, j"λ has size λ ≤ α, so j"λ ∈ j(P κ λ). Thus extendibility implies supercompact-for-L 2 κ , κ. †
The key to these equivalences is that the condition about j"λ in Theorem 3.5.(4) often had more to do with the closure of the target model (i.e., is j"λ in M?), rather than the nature of the relations ship between j(I) and j"λ. When we have extendible-like embeddings, j"λ is always in the target model, so many of the type omitting compactness principles (or even just compactness principles) become trivial.
A possible explanation for the collapse of the identity crisis is that type omission in L n κ,κ is expressible 7 in L n+1 κ,κ , which is again codeable in L n κ,κ . Thus, one might expect no difference between strong compact-and supercompact-for-L 2 κ,κ . However, this does not explain why measurability coincides with these notions, and the below proposition shows that some notions of type-omitting compactness for L 2 are strictly stronger than extendibility (in consistency strength).
Proposition 4.4.
(1) κ is huge at λ-for-L 2 κ,κ iff for every α ≥ λ, there is j : V α → V β such that crit j = κ and j(κ) = λ.
(2) If κ is almost 2-huge at λ 1 , λ 2 , then there is a κ-complete, normal ultrafilter on κ containing
This is immediate for φ-type omission for fixed φ, and any type omission can be coded as φ-type omission in an expansion.
(3) If κ is huge-for-L 2 κ,κ , then there is a κ-complete, normal ultrafilter on κ containing {α < κ | α is huge}
Proof: The first item is just a restatement of Theorem 4.1 with
Since α was arbitrary,
κ . Then U ∈ V β , so V β "κ is huge." Thus, {α < κ | α is huge} is in the normal, κ-complete ultrafilter on U generated from j. † Similar results show that n-huge-for-L 2 κ,κ lies strictly between n-huge and almost n + 1-huge. The preceding argument is due to Gabriel Goldberg, who also reports that he can show that huge-for-L 2 κ,κ can be characterized in terms of hyperhugeness. Recall that κ is λ-hyperhuge iff there is j : V → M with crit j = κ and j(λ) M ⊂ M and κ is hyperhuge iff it is λ-hyperhuge for every λ. Hyperhuge cardinals have recently been shown to imply the existence of a minimal inner model of V that can reach V by set-forcing extensions by Usuba [Usu] . Goldberg proves that κ being hyperhuge is equivalent to the existence of a κ 0 < κ such that κ 0 is huge at κ-for-L 2 κ,κ . Additionally, κ being λ-hyperhuge is equivalent to the existence of µ > λ and a normal, fine, κ-complete ultrafilter on
λ * κ -κ-compact for type omission by Theorem 3.5. Examining the proof of Theorem 4.1, we see that a level-by-level characterization of, e.g., α-extendibility is harder due to the tricky nature of the Löwenheim-Skolem number for second-order logics. In first-order, the Löwenheim-Skolem number of L λ,κ for theories of size µ is ((λ + µ) <κ ) + , which is also its Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski number. (1) κ is weakly compact-for-L 2 ∪ L κ,ω (2) κ is weakly compact-for-L Proof: Clearly, (2) implies (1). We show (1) implies (3) implies (2).
) V β "j(f )(κ) j"T " and V β is correct about this (3) j"T and T are just renamings of the same theory Thus, the suitably renamed j(f )(κ) witnesses that T is satisfiable. † A key piece in translating weak compactness for second-order into an embedding characterization is the ability to axiomatize well-foundedness. If we look at a fragment of L 2 κ,κ that includes an expression of well-foundedness, then weak compactness for this fragment is characterizable in a similar way, replacing ℓ 2 κ with the Löwenheim-Skolem number of that fragment. However, if the fragment cannot express well-foundedness, then this characterization is harder.
Similar results can be proved by restricting the size of the theories under consideration. In the general scheme, the theory T is allowed to be as large as one wants, as are the pieces T s of the filtration. If one restricts these pieces to be of size ≤ µ and wants to characterize L 2 κ,κ being I-κ-compact for type omission, then it suffices to look at an embedding as in Theorem 4.1.(2) for α equal to the Löwenheim-Skolem number of L 2 κ,κ for µ-sized theories. For the characterizations of strong and its variants, we need the concept of a Henkin secondorder structure that is full up to some rank. Recall the notion of a Henkin model described in Section 2. Definition 4.6. Let M * = (M, P, E) be a Henkin structure and A a transitive set.
(1) M * is full to A iff every X ∈ P(M ) ∩ A is represented in P ; this means that there is c X ∈ P such that, for all y ∈ M , y ∈ X ⇐⇒ M * yEc X (2) M * is full up to rank α iff it is full to V α .
While a Henkin structure has a nonstandard interpretation of second-order quantifiers, other additions to the logic must be interpreted standardly. In particular, the next theorem discusses Henkin models of L 2 (Q W F )-theories; while any second-order assertions of well-foundedness-i.e., "∀X∃y∀z(y ∈ X ∧ z ∈ X → yRz)"-can be satisfied non-standardly, any Q W F assertions of well-foundedness-i.e., Q W F xy(xRY )-must be correctly interpreted (and so R is well-founded).
Theorem 4.7. The following are equivalent for κ ≤ λ.
(1) κ is λ-strong.
is a theory that can be written as an increasing union T = ∪ α<κ T α such that every T α has a (full) model, then T has a Henkin model whose universe is an ordinal and is full up to rank λ. (3) Same as (2), but there is also a type p = {φ i (x) | i < κ} such that T α has a (full) model omitting p α , and the resulting model omits p.
Note that we add the condition on the universe of the model in (2) to remove the possibility that the "full up to rank λ" condition is vacuous; if the universe of M just consists of elements of rank bigger than λ, then M is trivially full up to rank λ.
Proof: First, suppose that κ is λ-strong and let T be a theory and p a type as in (3). We produce a model of T in the standard way: let f be a function with domain κ such that f (α) is a model of T α . WLOG, f (s) is a full Henkin structure. Then, in M, j(f )(κ) is a model of (a theory containing) j"T and M "j(f )(κ)is a full Henkin structure that omits j(p) κ = j"p". M is incorrect about second-order satisfaction above rank λ; however, since V λ ⊂ M, it is correct about second-order satisfaction up to rank λ.
Second, suppose we have compactness. Then we wish to build an embedding witnessing strength. By the normal arguments, e.g. [Kan08, Section 26] or see Proposition 5.2, it is enough to derive a (κ, λ )-extender from an embedding j : V κ+2 → M with crit j = κ, V λ ⊂ M, and M well-founded. We can find such a model by considering the theory
This can be written as an increasing κ-length union of satisfiable theories in the standard way and any model leads to, after taking transitive collapse, the necessary j : V κ+2 → M. †
We could ask for a variation of (2) that allows for arbitrary κ-satisfiable theories or, equivalently, theories indexed by some P κ µ. This would be equivalent to a jointly λ-strong and µ-strongly compact cardinal: there is a j : V → M such that crit j = κ, V λ ⊂ M, and there is Y ∈ j(P κ µ) such that j"µ ⊂ Y .
If we drop the Q W F , then we can characterize a weakening of λ-strong. In the following theorem and proof, we break the convention that M always denotes some transitive model of a fragment of ZF C. In particular, we allow it to be ill-founded. For such models, wf p(M) denotes the well-founded part of M.
Theorem 4.8. The following are equivalent for κ ≤ λ.
(1) κ is non-standardly λ-strong: there is an elementary embedding j : V → M with M not necessarily transitive such that crit j = κ and V λ ⊂ wf p(M). (2) If τ is a language and T ⊂ L 2 κ,ω is a theory that can be written as an increasing, continuous union T = ∪ α<κ T α such that every T α has a (full) model, then T has a Henkin model whose universe is an ordinal and is full up to rank λ.
Proof:
The proof is the same as Theorem 4.7, with the changes exactly that we no longer insist on being correct regarding statements about well-foundedness.
† An argument of Goldberg shows that the level-by-level notions of non-standardly λ-strong and λ-strong are inequivalent, but full non-standard strong is equivalent to strong.
C
(n) and sort logic. Moving to sort logic, we can prove a metatheorem along the lines of Theorems 3.5 and 4.1 by introducing the notion of a C (n) -cardinal. The C (n) variants of large cardinals were introduced by Bagaria [Bag12] . Briefly, set
≺ Σn is elementarity for Σ n formulas in the Levy hierarcy (in the language of set theory). For a large cardinal notion P witnessed by a certain type of elementary embedding, κ is C (n) -P iff there is an elementary embedding j witnessing that κ is P and so j(κ) ∈ C (n) . Recently, Tsaprounis [Tsa, Corollary 3.5] and Gitman and Hamkins [GH, Theorem 15] have independently shown that C (n) -extendibility is equivalent to the a priori stronger notion of C (n)+ -extendibility: κ is C (n)+ -extendible iff for all α > κ in C (n) , there j : V α → V β with crit j = κ and j(κ), β ∈ C (n) . It is the notion of C (n)+ -extendibility that we will use. For some large cardinal notions, there is no increase of strength from moving to the C (n) -versions (measurable, strong [Bag12, Propositions 1.1 and 1.2], strongly compact [Tsa14, Theorem 3.6]), but several other notions give an increasing hierarchy of strength. Recall the notions of sort logic described in Section 2 Theorem 4.9. Let κ ≤ λ, n < ω, and I ⊂ P(λ) be κ-robust. The following are equivalent:
, there is some j : V α → V β such that crit j = κ, j"λ ∈ j(I), and β ∈ C (n) .
The proof of Theorem 4.9 follows the structure of Theorems 3.5 and 4.1. To make the necessary changes, we introduce the following notion and lemma. Given a Σ n formula φ(x) (in the Levy hierarchy), let φ ∼ (x) ∈ L s,Σn be the same formula where unbounded quantifiers are replaced with the corresponding sort quantifiers. This allows us to characterize C (n) as follows.
For a ∈ V α , we always have φ(a) holds in V iff V α φ ∼ (a). The above theory makes this equivalent to V α φ(a). † Proof of 4.9: We sketch the proof and highlight the changes from the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Given the compactness, we prove (3) by considering the theory and type
We filtrate this according to I in the standard way and use expansion of V α to provide witness models; here it is crucial that we started with α ∈ C (n) . The model of T omitting p gives the desired j. We can adjust this proof to get a proof of (4) by finding strong limit α ′ > α, also in C (n) , and relativizing the appropriate parts of the theory to ensure that j(α) ∈ C (n) . Then, derive the extender E from this model, and j E : V → M E that retains the desired properties. Given (3) or (4), we prove the compactness by starting with a filtrationT = {T s | s ∈ I} of an L s,Σn κ,κ -theory and types {p a (x) = {φ a i (x) | i < λ} | a ∈ A}, find strong limit α ∈ C (n) above the rank of these objects and the function f that takes s to the model of T s omitting each p a s . V α reflects these properties since α ∈ C (n) , so by elementarity the target model thinks that j(f )(j"λ) models j"T and omits {j"p a (x) | a ∈ A}. Since V β or V j(α) are Σ n -elementary in V , the target model is correct. † Similar to second-order logic, the identity crisis disappears in sort logic and C (n) -extendible cardinals witness a wide range of type omitting compactness. We use the following lemma which will also be useful when examining Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski numbers. This is similar to Magidor's characterization of supercompacts.
Lemma 4.11. Let κ be C (n) -extendible. Then for all α > κ in C (n) and R ⊂ V α , there are cofinally many γ < κ such that there areᾱ < κ in C (n) and S ⊂ Vᾱ with elementary j : (Vᾱ, ∈, S) → (V α , ∈, R), crit j = γ, and j(γ) = κ.
This is witnessed by j ↾ V α . By elementarity,
This is the desired result; note that it impliesᾱ ∈ C (n) because α ′ is. † Proposition 4.12. The following are equivalent for every n < ω. (1) The conclusion of Lemma 4.11.
(2) For all α < κ, if N is a structure in a strictly first-order language of size < κ, then there is M ≺ Lα,α N of size < κ such that M and N have the same L s,Σn α,α -theory. Proof: (1) implies (2): Find γ < κ above α and |τ | and find α ′ > κ such that N ∈ V α ′ . Code the structure N into a relation R ⊂ V α ′ By assumption, there isᾱ ∈ (γ, κ) in C (n) and j : (Vᾱ, ∈, S) → (V α , ∈, R) with crit j > γ. Then S codes a structure M in Vᾱ that, by elementarity, models T h L s,Σn α,α (N ). Moreover, j ↾ M is L α,α -elementary, so the range of j ↾ M is the desired model.
(2) implies (1): Fix α > κ in C (n) , R ⊂ V α , and β < κ. Apply the assumption to the structure (V α , ∈, R, δ) δ<β to get M ≺ L β,β N with the same L s,Σn -theory. This includes Magidor's Φ, so after taking the transitive collapse, we get ≺ L β,β -elementary j : (Vᾱ, ∈, S, δ) δ<β → (V α , ∈, R, δ) δ<β . The constants for the elements of β force the critical point of j above β. † 4.2. Rank-into-rank. We now turn to the strongest large cardinal principles, the rank-into-rank embeddings. For an excellent survey of these, see Dimonte [Dimar] or the expanded Dimonte [Dim] . We can cast I1, I2, and I3 in a uniform way by saying, for n < ω, I2 n (κ, δ) is the assertion There is j : V δ → V δ , κ = crit j, δ is the supremum of the critical sequence, and j is Σ , and I1 is I2 <ω .
Note that second-order elementary embeddings should be understood in the context of Section 4.3. Given j : V δ → V δ , we can naturally extend this to j
Note that j + is the only possible extension of j to V δ+1 that could be elementary and it's Σ 1 0 -elementarity follows from its first-order elementarity. These principles have natural characterizations in terms of extendibility criteria. Recall that κ is weakly compact iff every κ-sized structure has a proper L κ,κ -elementary extension [Kan08, Theorem 4.5] and κ is measurable iff every ≥ κ-sized structure has a proper L κ,κ -elementary extension.
Proposition 4.14. For each n ≤ ω, the following are equivalent.
(1) I2 n (κ, δ) (2) Every δ-sized structure has a proper Σ 1 2n (L κ,ω )-elementary extension isomorphic to itself. Proof: For one direction, take (V δ , ∈) as the δ-sized structure. After collapse, δ is necessarily strong limit and the sup of the critical sequence by the Kunen inconsistency.
For the other direction, if M is a structure of size δ, we can arrange |M | = δ. Then j ↾ δ lifts to j − : M → M , which inherits the elementarity of J. † I3 and I2 also have standard characterizations in terms of coherent ω-sequences of normal ultrafilters. This allows us to prove the following type omitting compactness from them. Unfortunately, this does not give an equivalence, but does allow us to sandwich these properties between two compactness for omitting types statements. Recall that any type can be trivially extended to an equivalent, larger one by adding instances of "x = x." Theorem 4.15.
(1) If I2 0 (κ, δ), then for any theory T = ∪ s∈Pκκ T s ⊂ L κ,ω (τ ) and set of types {p β = {φ β i (x) | i < κ n β +1 } | β < µ}, if there are club many s ∈ P κ κ such that T s has a model M s with the property 8 Laver's paper attributes this result to Martin without citation, but other sources attribute it to Laver 9 Which is in turn equivalent to being elementary about statements of well-foundedness [Dim, Lemma 6.13].
We will use the ultrafilter characterizations of these cardinals, in part because I3 doesn't have a characterization in terms of j : V → M and we don't want to restrict to models of size ≤ δ.
Proof: We prove the second item. The first follows by the same argument, just removing the mentions of well-foundedness.
I2 1 (κ, δ) is equivalent to the existence of κ-complete, normal ultrafilters U n on [κ n+1 ] κn (where {κ n | n < ω} is the critical sequence of the witnessing embedding) such that (1) coherence: For any X ⊂ [κ n+1 ] κn and m > n,
(2) well-founded: For any {n i < ω | i < ω} and {X i ∈ U ni | i < ω}, there is s ⊂ δ such that, for all i < ω, s ∩ κ ni+1 ∈ X i . Let M s be the desired models. Since they exists for club many s and U 0 contains this club, we can form the direct limit of the ultrapowers as standard:
Then M * is the direct limit of these models. Standard arguments (see Proposition 5.3 for a more general case) show that Loś' Theorem holds for formulas of L κ,ω (Q W F ). This guarantees that M * T . To show the type omission, let β < µ and [n, f ]Ū ∈ M * . Setting n ′ = max n, n β , this implies
Define a function h on X by setting, for t ∈ X, h(t) ∈ t such that M t∩κ ¬φ β h(t) (f (t ∩ κ n+1 )); this is possible exactly because of the type omission. Then, h is regressive on a U n ′ -large set, so there is α 0 < κ n ′ +1 such that
f ]Ū and β we arbitrary, we are done, †
We can also isolate a type omitting compactness stronger than these rank-into-rank axioms. Note that, unlike previous theorems, the types in the following don't shrink in the hypothesis. (1) Suppose we have the following for some κ: For any L ω,ω (τ )-theory T with a filtration {T α | α < κ} and |τ | = δ and any L ω,ω (τ )-types Γ = {p i (x) | i < δ}, if every T α has a model omitting Γ, then T has a model omitting Γ. Then there is κ 0 ≤ κ such that I2 0 (κ 0 , δ).
(2) The above implies I2 n (κ, δ) after replacing the logic with Σ 1 2n (L ω,ω ). Proof: Fix a bijection f : δ → V δ . Consider the theory T = ED Lω,ω (V δ , ∈, x) x∈V δ ∪ {c i < c < c κ } ∪ {d i Ed j | i, j < δ, h(i) ∈ h(j)} and, for i < δ, the types p i (x) = {xEd i ∧ x = d j | j < δ, h(j) ∈ h(i)} and p δ (x) = {x = d i | i < δ}. Then this theory is chain compact by considering the structure V δ , which omits all of the types. Then any model of T omitting the types gives rise to the desired elementary embedding in the standard way. † 4.3. Elementary substructure for L 2 . In contrast with first-order logic
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, the notion of elementary substructure in second-order logic has not been well-studied. As evidence to this, in Väänänen's paper on second-order logic and set theory [Vää01] , the word 'structure' appears 210 times, but 'substructure,' 'sub-structure,' or even 'sub structure' never appear. Similarly, Shapiro's book [Sha91] never discusses the matter 11 . A guess at the cause for this is that secondorder logic is often employed to find categorical theories, whereas first-order logic attempts only to axiomatize classes of structures. In such contexts, there is no reason to talk about one model's relation with others.
A first-attempt at second-order elementary substructure would be to work in analogy with first-order and say M is a L 2 -elementary substructure of N iff every formula holds of parameters from M in M iff it holds in N . However, this notion doesn't allow for any proper elementary extensions as there are definable sets that must grow. Concretely, the formula φ(X) := "∀x (x ∈ X) " must be satisfied by the entire universe, so no extension of M can think φ(M ) holds. A more modest generalization is used by Magidor and Väänänen in [MV11, Between Definitions 3 and 4]. They say that M is an L 2 -elementary substructure of N iff the above property holds restricted to formulas with only first-order free variables. This works (in the sense that proper extensions can exist), and they observe that Magidor's theorem on the Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski number of second-order extends to this notion of elementarity. However, it seems lacking as there's no discussion of free variables in second order.
We give a definition of elementary substructure in second-order logic in Definition 4.18 below. An important point is that this definition includes a stronger notion of substructure in the secondorder context (see Definition 4.17). Before giving the formal definitions, we give a motivation. Any second-order structure M can be viewed as a Henkin structure
. Then every second-order statement about M can be transferred to a first-order statement about M + , and the fact that M + is a full structure (isomorphic to (M, P(M ), ∈)) can be captured by a single second statement Ψ asserting every subset of M is represented by a member of E. Also, for such a language, ≺ L 2 will imply elementarity in the sense of Magidor and Väänänen.
For a general notion of ≤, a ≤-embedding is f : M → N such that f is a τ -isomorphism onto its range and f (M ) ≤ N (a set theorist might prefer to call this model f "M ). Specializing to ≺ L 2 , f is a map on elements of M and, given s
To avoid this unfortunate notation, we say that
One should be skeptical that this is the "right" notion of ≺ L 2 as it adds a strange new condition about global choices of extensions of subsets. In addition to the heuristic with Henkin models above, we offer two "sanity" checks that this is the right notion.
The first check is that Magidor's Theorem on the LST number of second order logic holds with this notion. This follows from the argument given in our heuristic: take a model N , turn it into a full Henkin structure N + with Skolem functions, and apply Magidor's version along with the sentence ∀X∃x (X' = 'x). This quotational equality is an abbreviation of the statement that X and x have the same elements.
The second check is the natural notion of an elementary diagram characterizes L 2 -elementary embedability. Given a τ -structure M , we define it's L 2 elementary diagram by first adding a first-order constant c a for each a ∈ M and a second-order constant d s for each s ∈ P ω (M ) and setting
. . , a n , s 1 , . . . , s k )} Proposition 4.20. Let M, N be τ -structures. The following are equivalent.
(1) N has an expansion that models
Proof: The proof follows as the first-order one. Given Proposition 4.21 (Tarski-Vaught Test for ≺ L 2 ). Given M ⊂ 2 N (with a specified extension map s → s N ), we have that M ≺ L 2 N iff both of the following hold:
However, properties such as coherence and smoothness under unions of chains fail, as witnessed by Silver's example (the bane of many a nonelementary model theorist's hope). Recall Silver's example
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: the language consists of two sorts P and Q and the sentence φ Silver is ∃E ⊂ P × Q (∀x, y ∈ Q (x = y ⇐⇒ ∀z ∈ P (zEx ⇐⇒ zEy)))
In other words, a model M of φ Silver consists of two sets P M and Q M such that there is an extensional relation on P M and Q M . The existence of such a relation is equivalent to there being an injection from P M to P(Q M ), which is equivalent to
M | , but it fails in this case. Thus, we can find counterexamples to coherence and smoothness under unions of chains. Note that, since the language is first-order, M ⊂ 2 N is equivalent to normal substructure.
• Coherence:
We can also define Skolem function for second-order in the same way as first-order. To do so, we must add strictly second-order functions to the language, so that even if τ started out strictly first-order, its Skolemization τ sk won't be.
In the context of first-order, the notions of elementary substructure and that of club sets are very closely intertwined. For instance, given a structure M and cardinal κ < M , {s ∈ P κ λ : s is the universe of an elementary substructure of M } is club, and, conversely, given a club C ⊂ P κ λ, we can find a structure M with universe λ such that the above set is contained in C. This connection is mediated by the fact that both notions can be characterized by being the closure sets of certain functions (Skolem functions, in the case of elementary substructure).
With a definition for second-order elementary substructure in hand, we can define a notion of club, which we call superclubs. Recall our focus on L 2 .
Definition 4.22.
n = x and f (x) ⊂ X n and f fixes every finite set. (3) Fix µ < κ and let
we have F i (a, f (x)) = f (y) for some y ∈ P ω (s)} (4) We call the collection F of all sets containing some C(F ) the superclub filter.
Although we defined it with a combinatorial characterization in the spirit of Definition 3.1, our interest in superclubs comes from the following model theoretic characterization.
Lemma 4.23. The superclub filter is generated by sets of the form
for M a τ -structure with universe λ and |τ | < κ.
Proof: First, suppose we are given {F α | α < µ}. Set τ = {F n;m1,...,m k α | α < µ; k, n, m i < ω} to be a functional language so the domain of F n;m1,...,m k α is M n × P(M m1 ) × · · · × P(M m k ). Expand λ to a τ -structure by interpreting F n;m1,...,m k α as F α restricted to the appropriate arity.
Second, suppose we are given M with universe λ. WLOG, we can assume that τ has (secondorder) Skolem functions. LetF = {F M | F ∈ τ } be the functions of M (interpreted as projection on other arities). Then, since we have Skolem functions, C(F ) ⊂ D(M ). † This model-theoretic characterization tends to be more useful to show the things that we want.
Corollary 4.24. The superclub filter extends the club filter.
Proof: The club filter can be characterized in the same way using first-order elementary substructure. †
The next proposition shows that calling this a filter is justified.
Proposition 4.25. The superclub filter is a κ-complete, possibly non-proper filter.
Proof: It is a filter by definition. Given D(M α ) with M α a τ α structure, set M * to be the ∪τ α -structure that is simultaneously an expansion of each M α . † Proposition 4.25 leaves open the possibility that the superclub filter is non-proper, i.e., contains the empty set. In fact, the properness of the superclub filter characterizes supercompact cardinals.
Theorem 4.26. Let κ ≤ λ.
(1) If κ is not λ-supercompact, then there is an empty superclub. Moreover, there is a uniform definition of the empty superclub. (2) If κ is λ-supercompact, then every normal, fine, κ-complete ultrafilter on P κ λ extends the superclub filter.
Proof: If κ is not λ-supercompact, then by Corollary 4.19, there is a structure M of size λ in a langauge τ of size < κ such that M has no ≺ L 2 -substructures; looking at Magidor's proof, we can take M to be some (V β , ∈, α) α∈µ for some β < λ and µ < β. WLOG |M | is λ by expanding the universe by a trivial sort. Then D(M ) = ∅ is in the superclub filter.
On the other hand, let U be a normal, κ-complete ultrafilter on P κ λ and derive j U : V → M U . Let M be a τ -structure with universe λ and, WLOG, it has Skolem functions. By Magidor's result and its extensions,
In particular, we get the following:
Corollary 4.27. Given κ ≤ λ, κ is λ-supercompact iff the superclub filter on P κ λ is proper.
While superclubs give a characterization of supercompact cardinals, they lack a nice characterization in the spirit of "closed unbounded sets" that clubs have. Such a characterization would shed light on properties of the ≺ L 2 relations and permit the exploration of superstationary sets.
Extenders and omitting types
A key distinction between Theorem 3.5 and Theorems 4.1 and 4.9 is the lack of an analogue of Theorem 3.5.(3) in the results of Section 4. The large cardinals of Section 4 are typically characterized by the existence of certain kinds of extenders, but the modifier "certain" is typically characterized in a way that nakedly concerns embeddings between models of set theory-e.g., [Kan08, Exercise 26 .7] characterizes κ being λ-strong by the existence of an extender E such that j E : V → M E witnesses λ-strength-rather than any combinatorial feature of the extender.
We begin with a combinatorial characterization, although it still references the V α 's and may be of limited interest. However, we use this as a starting point to investigate a larger question: to what extent is second-order logic necessary to characterize the large cardinals in Section 4?
We should say a few words about our definition of extenders. We say that a (κ, λ)-extender
<ω }, where each E a is a κ-complete ultrafilter on a λ satisfying coherence, normality, and well-foundedness (see [Kan08, Section 26] |a| . Crucially, we also depart from both of these and don't require that {s ∈ a κ | ∀a 1 , a 2 ∈ a (a 1 < a 2 ↔ s(a 1 ) < s(a 2 ))} ∈ E a . Now we are ready to give a combinatorial characterization.
Definition 5.1. We say a bijection h : α → V α is rank-layering iff for every β < α, h" β = V β .
Note this condition is equivalent to x ∈ y ∈ V α implies h −1 (x) ∈ h −1 (y).
Proposition 5.2. The following are equivalent.
(2) For some rank-layering bijection h : λ → V λ , there is a (κ, λ )-extender E such that for all α, β < λ, we have
(3) For every rank-layering bijection h : λ → V λ , there is a (κ, λ )-extender E such that for all α, β < λ, we have h(α) ∈ h(β) ⇐⇒ {s ∈ {α,β} κ | h(s(α)) ∈ h(s(β))} ∈ E {α,β}
In each of the cases, we have that x ∈ V λ is the image of [{h −1 (x)}, s → h • s • h −1 (x)] E after the transitive collapse.
Proof of Proposition 5.2: (3) implies (2) is obvious, and (2) implies (1) is proven by working through the standard arguments. (1) implies (3) is also proven by the standard arguments, except one seeds the extender by
Now we turn to the issue of how necessary logics beyond L ∞,∞ are to characterize large cardinals and focus on strong cardinals. Theorem 4.7 characterizes strong cardinals in terms of the logic L 2 ; is there a characterization of strong cardinals solely in terms of L ∞,∞ ? For κ ≤ λ, consider the following (definable-class) L κ,ω (Q W F )-theory and types for y ∈ V λ : τ = {E, c a , c, d a ′ } a∈V,a ′ ∈V λ T = ED Lκ,ω (Q W F ) (V, ∈, x) x∈V ∪ {d i = c i < c < c
It follows from the methods of the previous sections that T has a model omitting each p y iff κ is λ-strong. However, what we lack from Proposition 3.10 is an appropriate type omittingcompactness scheme and a decomposition of T along that scheme that is satisfiable. The difficulty in constructing this becomes more clear if we look at the extender product construction. Given a (κ, λ)-extender E, for each a ∈ [λ] <ω , we form the ultraproduct V /E a . The coherence axiom and Loś' Theorem insures that the restriction function induces a coherent system of L κ,κ -elementary embedding from V /E a to V /E b when a ⊂ b. Since [λ] <ω is directed, we can get a colimit V /E and L κ,ω -elementary embeddings. Since E is well-founded, so is V /E, so we can form its transitive collapse M E .
We can generalize this to a more general model-theoretic context. Fix some a ∈ [λ] <ω and suppose that we have a collection of τ -structures {M s | s ∈ a κ} and form the ultraproducts s∈ b κ M s↾a /E a for b ⊃ a. Again, the coherence gives a coherent system of embeddings, so we can form the extender product M s /E as the colimit of this system. This structure has universe
<ω , f ∈ b κ} where [b, f ] E = [c, g] E iff {s ∈ bc κ | f (s ↾ b) = g(s ↾ c)} ∈ E bc . Then we have following result for Loś' Theorem.
<ω } be a system of κ-complete ultrafilters satisfying coherence. The following are equivalent:
(1) E is well-founded (2) Loś' Theorem holds for L κ,ω (Q W F ) formulas. That is, given τ -structures {M s | s ∈ a κ}, φ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ L κ,ω (Q W F )(τ ), and [b 1 , f 1 ] E , . . . , [b n , f n ] E ∈ M s /E, we have
Proof: For one direction, it is known that E is well-founded iff V /E is well-founded, which follows from Loś' Theorem applied to Q W F xy(x ∈ y). For the other direction, fix b ∈ [λ] <ω and τ -structures {M s | s ∈ b κ}. We show Loś' Theorem for L κ,ω (Q W F ) by induction. Standard arguments take care of everything but the Q W F quantifier. So suppose Loś' Theorem holds for φ(x, y, z) and [a, f ] E ∈ M E := M s /E. First, suppose that {s ∈ a κ | M s↾b Q W F xyφ(x, y, f (s))} ∈ E a . Set X to be the complement of this set. For s ∈ X, there is c Second, suppose that X 0 = {s ∈ a κ | M s↾b Q W F xyφ(x, y, f (s))} ∈ E a and M E ¬Q W F xyφ(x, y, [a, f ] E ). Then there is [a r , f r ] E ∈ M E such that
for all r < ω and, WLOG, a ⊂ a r ⊂ a r+1 . Then
The well-foundedness of E gives h : ∪a → κ such that h ↾ a r+1 ∈ X r+1 and h ↾ a ∈ X 0 . Then, for r < ω, M h↾b φ(f r+1 (h ↾ a r+1 ), f r (h ↾ a r ), f (h ↾ a)) Thus, f r (h ↾ a r ) ∈ M h↾b | r < ω witnesses the illfoundedness of φ(x, y, f (h ↾ a)) in M h↾b , contradicting h ↾ a ∈ X 0 . † So, to decompose T above, one could try to construe V /E as an extender product M s /E in the appropriate language and for the appropriate a, and then see what fragment of T M s satisfies. However, the problem is that the factors that make up V /E don't have expansions to τ -structures. Rather, the analysis of V /E crucially uses that it can be seen as the extender power s∈ a κ V /E for any choice of a. Thus, there is no way to analyze which parts of the types each factor omits.
However, there is a nice criterion for when an extender product (or just a coherent ultraproduct by a κ-complete, well-founded coherent ultrafilter) omits a L κ,ω (Q W F )-type based on the behavior of the original models M s provided that the domain of the type is a subset that appears as an element of M E .
Proposition 5.4. Let E be a (κ, λ )-extender witnessing that κ is λ-strong. Suppose that a ∈ [ λ ] <ω , {M s | s ∈ a κ} is a collection of τ -structures, A ℓ ⊂ M s /E of rank ≤ λ for ℓ = 0, 1, and φ(x, y) ∈ L κ,ω (Q W F ). Set p(x) = {φ(x, a) | a ∈ A 0 } ∪ {¬φ(x, a) | a ∈ A 1 } and p s (x) = {φ(x, a) | a ∈ f 0 (s)} ∪{¬φ(x, a) | a ∈ f 1 (s)}, where [b, f ℓ ] E represents A ℓ in M E . Then, the following are equivalent:
(1) M s /E omits p. (2) {s ∈ b κ | M s↾a omits p s } ∈ E b .
Note that we have restricted both to the case of φ-types and the case where E is an extender witnessing strength for simplicity and it because it suffices for our assumption. We could remove these assumptions, instead requiring that A ℓ is an element of the subset sort of (M s , P(M s ), ∈)/E. Proof: The structure M s /E is (isomorphic to) j E (g)(a), where g is the function taking s ∈ a κ to M s and a = [a, s → s(a)] E . Then, since A ℓ ∈ V λ ∈ M E , Loś' Theorem for extenders tells us that M E "j E (g)(a) omits p" ⇐⇒ M E "j E (g)(a) omits the φ-type generated by A 0 , A 1 " ⇐⇒ {s ∈ b κ | g(s ↾ a) omits the φ-type generated by f 0 (s), f 1 (s)} ∈ E b ⇐⇒ {s ∈ b κ | M s↾a omits p s } ∈ E b † Still, this doesn't give a syntactic characterization of strength because it deals with type omission for types over sets, whereas Theorem 3.5 deals just with type omission over the empty set (in the appropriate language). Thus, we are still left with the following question.
Question 5.5. Given κ ≤ λ, is there a syntactic property of logics such that L κ,ω (Q W F ) (or some other sub-logic of L κ,κ ) satisfies this property iff κ is λ-strong?
